Post Segments
Kier Starmer wants school pupils to learn how to spot misinformation. I suspect we could all learn more about this including many politicians. I was recently asked to review a publication by an anti-Brexit think tank. The report was dated Jan 2024 so I wondered why anyone would be interested in it. However, as I did my usual checks of the numbers, I realised why I had been given this task.
Indexing
The paper claimed that trade between EU nations had ‘boomed’ since Brexit and that the UK had been left out of this ‘boom’ because of Brexit. To ‘prove this they produced a chart indexed to 2019 even though the transition period didn’t finish until the end of December 2020. During the period 2019 and 2020, Brexit did not affect UK-EU trade although covid lockdowns, travel bans, and factory closures did.
Rule number 1 for students of disinformation – always check the dates used for any indexing, the indexing date can easily be chosen to distort the conclusions.
Check the numbers
The paper went on to give monthly percentage changes for several industry sectors however their percentage change figures do not match any monthly change in ONS trade data even though this was cited as their source. For good measure, I also checked the 3 monthly data, the 12 monthly data and even the CVM monthly data although their table clearly stated the data was in current prices. My results (using ONS data published in Oct 2023 and available for the CER article in Jan 2024) are below:

Their figures, shown in the left-hand column above, just don’t tally with those calculated from data published by the ONS last October. I have given the whole numbers so you can check my calculations if you like. Or you can check the figures in this publication – UK trade: goods and services publication tables – Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk) – scroll down to the 12th October 2023 publication which contained the August 2023 figures. The paper specifically states that they are using August data because these were the latest figures available at the time the paper was written.
Maybe I missed something. But if they did manipulate the figures in any way, they certainly haven’t made that clear on their table shown below. Which also handily has a ‘Tweet this’ button beside it to help their readers spread this rather dubious information. I wonder how many people did and whether this would now be considered an offence deserving jail time by our new government. ONS trade data is also regularly revised. The latest ONS spreadsheet now shows a 9% increase in UK goods exports to the EU over the period Dec 2020 to Aug 2023 and 16% to non-EU markets.

Rule number 2 for students: No matter how professional something looks always check the figures.
Relative change versus absolute values
The other point to note in the table above is the equal emphasis given to the five export sectors, even though the UK’s largest goods export sector, Machinery and transport equipment, accounts for roughly half of the UK’s total goods exports and about a third of the UK’s goods exports to the EU.
Despite being given equal billing with Machinery and Transport in this table, Food and live animals are worth less than 3% and Alcohol and tobacco are less than 2% of UK exports (ONS, rolling 12 months, in current prices). This is probably why they were added together.
It is also worth noting that the table above does not include the UK’s third largest export sector – Fuels, although this is generally our second largest export to the EU. I can only imagine that this is because they are using current price data which does not account for inflation and the 49% increase in Fuel exports to the EU between Dec 2020 and August 2023 would have undermined their narrative about UK exports missing out on the EU’s ‘trade boom’.
Rule number 3: Are the comparators of equal size and significance? Does, for example, the increase in Machinery and Transport total cancel out the decrease in Miscellaneous Manufactures? Also, always look for what is missing from the data, are you only being shown selective data?
Data choices and equivalent accuracy
On the subject of fuel and inflation, we should also query why they are using current price data when the ONS publishes data in Chained Volume Measures in the same spreadsheet mentioned above, on Tabs 6,7 and 8. I often use current price data as it can contain more granular information by product code and individual trade partner. However, this table does not use granular data. It is using bulky SITC industry sector data and UK trade between EU and non-EU countries, so we should also question why they are using current price data. I suggest that this is because their data for the EU is only available in Current Prices. But as their calculation for the UK seems to not tally with the published figures, I suspect their EU data won’t either.
But there are other problems with comparing UK and EU data since Brexit. Most inter-EU trade is an estimate from Intrastat. It is not exact, there is often double counting of goods in transit across countries, and many goods landed in EU container ports are miscounted as goods exported by the country of the port’s location, usually the Netherlands or Belgium.
Since the UK left the EU, all UK trade with both the EU and the rest of the world is counted by HMRC and all imports require a customs declaration even if they are from the EU or from other countries with whom we have a trade agreement. This has caused quite a big change in our trade statistics. We have discovered that the UK never imported pineapple juice from the Netherlands or orange juice from Belgium but that these were just Intrastat miscounting known as the Rotterdam effect. There are literally hundreds of examples of this effect, including UK exports of tropical fruit and nuts to the EU. So I am extremely suspicious of EU trade data, and the supposed ‘Intra EU trade boom’ proclaimed in this paper.
Rule number 4: Are the figures you are being shown from reliable sources? Are they comparing figures from different sources and with different levels of reliability?
Rules of Origin and trade data
On the subject of statistical changes since Brexit, I should also mention the Rules of Origin in the UK’s trade agreement with the EU (TCA) as these have also made a large difference to both UK and EU trade statistics since Brexit. All trade agreements have rules of origin which determine which goods can be counted as made in the countries that are party to the trade agreement and therefore are able to benefit from tariff-free and quota-free access to each other’s markets.
Unfortunately for UK trade statists, although not for UK company profits, many of the goods that fall into the ‘Miscellaneous manufactures’ industry sector shown in the table above, are not manufactured in the UK or do not have enough of their value made in the UK to be counted as UK products for trade with the EU. That is the cause of the drop in this sector between December 2020 and August 2023 which no amount of inflation will ever bring back. That doesn’t mean the goods weren’t sold to EU customers, just that the EU did not count them as UK imports. And this is also true for UK Miscellaneous manufacture imports from the EU.
The best example of the Rules of Origin effect on UK-EU trade is shoes. We have seen UK shoe imports from Germany fall from £475,000 in 2019 to only £75,000 in 2023, UK shoe imports from France fall from £290,000 in 2019 to only £29,000 in 2023 and UK shoe imports from the Netherlands fall from £630,000 in 2019 to only £27,000 in 2023. In total UK shoe imports from the EU fell by almost 70% between 2019 and 2023. Meanwhile, shoe imports from Vietnam increased from £462,000 to £1.1 million, and shoe imports from Indonesia increased from £200,000 to almost £400,000. We also saw increased imports from China, Turkey, Bangladesh, Laos, and many other non-EU countries. People in the UK are still buying shoes, but we count them as imports from the country where they were made, not as imports from the country where their Brand is registered. (All figures from ITC COMTrade in Current Prices)
This change in trade was caused by the rules of origin in the UK-EU trade agreement and it also hit UK exports of toys and sporting goods made in China for UK sporting brands. While UK Jewellery, both non-perishable and of high value relative to its storage costs, saw exports increase by 85% in 2019 in case the UK left the EU without a trade deal as the UK Prime Minister, Thersa May, was threatening to do. That of course didn’t happen, and UK jewellery exports to the EU have fallen back to their pre-2019 levels which is considerably lower than their 2019 highs.
Rule number 5: always look at trade data before as well as after an event. And always check for any other explanation as to why trade may have changed. Preferably ask someone who has read the UK-EU trade agreement.
Convenient explanations confirming the hypothesis
Instead, of looking at the pre-2019 data, the authors of the paper being reviewed tried to pass off this drop in export values as due to small firms being unable to afford the paperwork, with no mention of the Rules of Origin or pre-Brexit stockpiling or even that trade costs are generally paid by the importer, not the exporter. Instead, they claimed:
‘Take miscellaneous manufactures, which include an array of items like medical equipment and supplies, jewellery, sporting goods, toys and office supplies – the type of goods produced by medium and small firms that have struggled the most with the border costs imposed by Brexit. UK exports in this category to the EU declined by a staggering 30 per cent, while EU-to-EU trade grew by a healthy 9 per cent.’
They also forgot to mention that Miscellaneous manufactures include building materials, furniture, articles of clothing, footwear, scientific instruments and works of art. All are generally made or sold by very large companies that export goods all over the world and seem to have no trouble filling in the paperwork when they are exporting to the US – the UK’s largest export market.
And we should note from rule number 4, above, that the measurement of the trade in the Miscellaneous manufactures sector between EU countries hasn’t changed since Brexit simply because Intrastat will still be counting goods made in Asia for EU brands as EU-to-EU trade, especially if the goods were landed in the Netherlands or Belgium. So in this case, the author of the paper should be comparing any change in UK exports to the EU with any change in EU exports to the UK. Not with EU exports to other EU countries.
Rule number 6: Are the explanations for any statistical change credible, did they leave out any important data, or are they comparing apples and oranges?
Strange Comparators
Finally, the paper goes on to compare UK service exports with ‘the average of the 22 economies considered to be the most advanced by the IMF in 1995. Microsoft’s copilot tells me these were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland the United Kingdom and the United States. You will probably notice that there are some very different-sized economies in this list and I would hope that they have done a weighted average, but they probably didn’t.
And as with goods, the paper compares just 5 service sectors, leaving out the rest, and gives them all equal weighting even though ‘Other Business Services’ is now the UK’s largest export sector, bigger than the UK’s mighty Machinery and Transport goods sector.
The paper notes the fall in UK Financial Service exports and Transport service exports, indexed to 2019, and relative to the average of the 22 countries listed above, between 2019 and Q2 2023, and claims that this fall is due to Brexit because:
‘the EU’s single market is most developed and there are big barriers to EU market access for countries outside the bloc.’
It is hard to understand how the paper concludes that Brexit is the problem when only 13 of the 22 countries in their average are in the EU. It is also hard to imagine what contribution some of these countries had to the ‘Average’ in either Transport or Financial service exports, although I am sure they all have thriving domestic markets.
By selecting a list of countries based on their economies in 1995, the paper has managed to miss out major Financial Service exporters: Singapore, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Cyprus and China. But include some minnows like Denmark, New Zealand, Finland, Portugal and Iceland. And apart from the US, UK and Luxembourg, the other nations in the 22 don’t export large values of Financial Services as you can see in the graph below:

Firstly, this graph makes it obvious that three countries dominate financial service exports amongst the selected 22: the US, the UK and Luxembourg. It is hard to pretend that UK Financial Service exports are collapsing when you see the absolute export values rather than an indexed comparison to an average, which may or may not have been weighted. It is also worth noting that UK Financial Service exports depend on the strength of international markets and the number of Initial Public Offerings, Mergers and Acquisitions and large capital raisings. These are high-value low-volume transactions and spasmodic by nature.
Doing the same research on Transport throws up some even more interesting information. Singapore and China are two of the world’s largest Transport service exporters but didn’t make the chosen 22 countries used to compare the UK. Nor did Turkey, South Korea and Hong Kong also large Transport service exporters. And anyone involved in the EU transport industry won’t be surprised to see that Romania exports more Transport services than many EU members but didn’t make the 22. Meanwhile, the inclusion of New Zealand and Iceland in the 22 seems a bit strange.
The other interesting point is that the UK’s Transport exports haven’t collapsed irretrievably due to Brexit as claimed by the paper under review and this was never a large export sector for the UK. UK Transport exports fell during Covid but were back above their pre-Covid levels in 2023. While Germany, France and Denmark saw a massive increase in their exports in mid-2022 but have fallen back rather dramatically since then. It is a pity that Singapore and China didn’t make the chosen 22 as they, not any EU member, have seen the largest increases in their transport exports since 2019.

Rule number 7 : Beware of any unusual grouping of comparators, averages between massive economies and tiny ones, and indexed comparisons against a contrived average. They are all probably misleading.
Models versus reality
It has always surprised me that the author of the paper under review likes to use the economic results of non-EU countries and claim that their performance reflects the potential UK economic performance if it had remained a member of the EU. But that would appear to be the point of this whole paper. The author is trying to cherry-pick actual trade data to help support his econometric doppelganger model, rather than adjusting his model so that it better fixes the actual economic data.
Apparently, George E. P. Box, UK statistician, once said: ‘All econometric models are wrong, but some are useful.’ I have always thought that the usefulness was to give companies or governments a guide as to how to prepare for the future. However, in this case, I suspect this model is being used in an attempt to convince UK politicians that the economy would be stronger if the UK had remained in the EU. But no major EU member state has had a buoyant economy since the UK left. Germany in particular has performed poorly compared to the UK.
Below for example is a graph of data from the World Bank database for France, Germany and the UK’s GDP in PPP terms, indexed on 2020 as this was the year of the Transition Period when the UK and EU countries continued to trade as they did when the UK was a member.

I imagine it will only take a few seconds before the Remainiacs who wrote the paper under review claim that this is an unfair comparison because 2020 was also the first year of Covid Lockdowns – but how often do they mention covid lockdowns in their papers admonishing Brexit and the UK?
So finally rule number 8: Beware econometric models, have they been adjusted to fit the data, or was the data cherry-picked to fit the model? Does the model maker appear to be fixated on a predetermined target? Did they look for any other influences that could have produced the results that they wished to pin on their target?
Cherry picking
And in case you think that I am being selective in my data, here is the same chart again for the 14 EU members in 1995. You can see that the UK is not an outlier but has had a similar post-Covid economic recovery to the other major EU members and has outperformed both France and Germany.
